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 Abstract 
In this paper, we suggest that the Investment Model of Commitment, developed in social 
psychology, offers a solution to an important microfoundational issue in audience cost theory.  
Audience cost models are useful for thinking about the foreign policy behaviors of democratic 
and non-democratic states.  However, they often assume that citizens reliably penalize leaders 
who break their foreign policy promises even though the empirical record suggests this is not 
always the case.  We argue that public commitment to foreign policy assets and relationships is a 
precondition for the application of audience costs.  Using the U.N. and NATO as case studies, 
we hypothesize that the commitments people develop to international organizations emerge as a 
function of (1) their satisfaction with the performance of the organization, (2) the investments in 
those organizations, and (3) an assessment of the alternatives to these associations.  Correlational 
and experimental tests of the model confirm that the strongest individual-level commitments 
arise when people are highly satisfied with the performance of specific institutions, believe that 
much has been invested in support of them, and perceive that the alternatives to particular 
institutions are poor.  Implications for the development of audience cost theory are discussed.
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 A growing literature suggests that foreign policy promises are more likely to be honored 
when they are issued publicly (Fearon 1994; Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff 2002; Schultz 
2001a; Lohmann 2003; Smith 1998; Tomz 2007).  Leaders who make public promises permit 
voters to observe their behavior and to hold them accountable for poor performance.  Thus, 
leaders who issue promises openly must take care to make good on their pledges since failure to 
do so may expose them to penalties (“audience costs”) that jeopardize their political careers. 
 Audience cost models are appealing because they help predict differences in the observed 
foreign policy behaviors of democratic and nondemocratic states across a wide range of issues.  
For instance, audience cost arguments help explain the inclination of democratic governments to 
delegate control over monetary policy to independent central banks (Broz 2002). Similarly, 
audience costs help us understand why democratic states tend to be more reliable allies than 
nondemocratic ones (Leeds 2003).  While audience cost arguments appear to give us improved 
explanatory leverage in these and other cases, both critics and supporters note that the 
microfoundations of audience cost models are weak (Clare 2007; Schultz 2001a; Smith 1998; 
Slantchev 2006).  Audience cost models assume that voters penalize leaders who renege on their 
public promises, but the empirical record suggests that domestic audiences can be forgiving 
(Clare 2007; Schultz 2001a).  As a result, audience cost models overstate the public’s willingness 
to punish leaders who violate their promises.  This is a problem because the certainty of 
punishment is the mechanism leaders use to establish the credibility of their claims; without it, 
pledges are dismissed as “cheap talk,” making cooperation difficult. 
What audience cost models require is a theory that explains the public’s varying taste for 
penalizing leaders who renege on foreign policy promises.  Recent advances in audience cost 
theory suggest that the public’s willingness to impose penalties depends on the “salience” of the 
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assets at stake (Clare 2007).  Yet, beyond this, audience cost models say little about the factors 
that convince voters that certain foreign policy assets and relationships are worth keeping.  This 
is the aspect of audience cost theory our work addresses.  Building on the Investment Model of 
Individual Commitment, developed by social psychologists (see Rusbult, 1980; Rusbult, Martz, 
and Agnew 1998), we argue that people develop commitments to foreign policy assets and 
relationships as a function of their: 1) satisfaction with the performance of the assets or 
relationships in question; 2) sense of the magnitude of investments made in support of those 
assets or relationships; and 3) beliefs about the availability of alternatives to these goods.   
Although social psychological models are often seen as challenging rational choice 
approaches (see McDermott 2004), there is no conflict between the two in this case.  Whereas 
some psychological research suggests that people respond differently to the same situations, 
work on the Investment Model suggests that the underlying dynamics of commitment are 
consistent across subjects (Le and Agnew 2003).  The strongest commitments arise when 
individuals are satisfied with the performance of specific associations, believe much has been 
invested in support of those relationships, and perceive that alternatives to an existing asset or 
relationship are poor.  The weakest commitments emerge when satisfaction is low, investments 
are thought to be small, and alternatives are enticing.  By implication, we do not expect the 
public to penalize leaders when their commitment to an asset or relationship is weak.  Only when 
public satisfaction with foreign policy assets is high, investments in these assets and relationships 
are thought to be great, and alternatives are considered poor do leaders risk disciplinary action by 
the public in the event they renege. 
 We examined the internal validity of these claims using laboratory methods that probed 
our respondents’ attachments to the U.S.’s relationship with the U.N. and NATO.  Audience cost 
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models are prominent in discussions of the credibility of promises made to international 
organizations, making these associations a useful testing ground for our approach.  The results 
support our model of citizen support for U.S. involvement in the U.N. and NATO.  We conclude 
that modeling satisfaction with, alternatives to, and investment in international organizations is a 
viable way to strengthen the microfoundations of existing audience cost approaches. 
 
AUDIENCE COSTS, COMMITMENTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 Interest in audience cost models arises from a basic problem that leaders face during the 
conduct of foreign affairs: convincing others to accept promises as honest reflections of their 
intentions.  Talk is “cheap” in international politics.  In well functioning domestic systems, 
governments make sure promises are honored, but the international system lacks an analogous 
“third party” to ensure that leaders are true to their words.  This state of affairs creates a climate 
of suspicion that interferes with genuine efforts at cooperation.  Since promises may be broken, 
leaders are inclined to doubt the veracity of verbal offers their counterparts make to them – even 
when those promises are sincere (Keohane 1984).  The trouble, then, for leaders interested in 
delivering on their promises is finding ways to distinguish their truthful utterances from the 
disingenuous ones issued by others (Fearon 1994; Kydd 2006). 
 Theoretically, solutions to the problem of suspicion are tied to the ability of leaders to 
make sacrifices that send unmistakable signals to others about their intentions.  These “costly 
signals” work by raising the penalties associated with reneging.  Using a variety of methods (see 
Fearon 1997), leaders back their words with deeds designed to provide others tangible evidence 
of their determination to behave as advertised. 
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 Audience cost models are part of the costly signals tradition.  Facing suspicion, leaders of 
stable democratic countries can establish the truthfulness of their intentions by placing their own 
political careers at risk.  Leaders do this by issuing public statements about their foreign policy 
intentions.  The resulting transparency enables citizens (“domestic audiences”) to observe their 
leaders’ performance in foreign policy.  The public is interested in retaining skillful leaders and 
uses its window into the foreign policy process to look for signs of ineptitude.   Reneging is an 
indicator of low skill the public watches for and retains an interest in penalizing (Smith 1998).  
For this reason, audience cost models suggest that leaders who back away from their stated 
positions can expect voters to remove them from office in favor of more skilled politicians. 
 Knowing that they face electoral penalties for reneging, farsighted leaders can use the 
prospect of punishment to establish the sincerity of their intentions since failing to follow 
through with pledges forces politicians to give up that which they value: their own careers.  This 
is the basis for the claim that promises made in front of domestic audiences are more reliable 
than those made behind closed doors.  Yet, for this logic to hold in all situations voters must 
reliably penalize leaders who break their foreign policy promises because it is the sureness of 
punishment that makes issuing public proclamations costly.  Otherwise, audience costs cannot be 
counted upon consistently to make public promises credible.  
 Empirically, it appears that voters do not invariably punish leaders who renege on foreign 
policy promises.  Sometimes leaders are punished and other times they are let “off the hook.”  
Work by Partell and Palmer (1999), Schultz (2001a), and Tomz (2007), for instance, shows 
citizens indeed hold leaders who renege during interstate crises accountable as audience cost 
models predict.  However, other research suggests these costs are imposed inconsistently in the 
aftermath of interstate confrontations (Chiozza and Goemans 2004; Schultz 2001b).  This 
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discrepancy between theory and evidence is also apparent in work on the credibility of monetary 
commitment mechanisms (Broz 2002) and trade liberalization agreements (Mansfield et al 2002).  
Broz (2002: 867), for example, assumes that domestic groups stand ready to punish democratic 
governments that violate promises to respect the independence of central banks, but it is unclear 
that the public actually does so when leaders politicize these institutions (Freeman 2002).  
 As Clare (2007) argues, it is more reasonable to assume that the certainty of audience 
imposed costs on leaders varies with public preferences over the assets, relationships, and 
policies in question.  Instead of equating all reneging with incompetence, Clare argues only those 
broken promises that significantly harm the public’s interests are problematic.  Punitive action 
against leaders is unwarranted unless breaking their promises puts select, valuable assets at risk.  
If leaders break promises in ways that promotes the public’s interests, leaders will be supported 
rather than sanctioned.  
 In addition to explaining variation in the application of audience costs, focusing on the 
“salience” (Clare 2007, 735) of goods provides insight into the reasons voters might punish 
leaders who break foreign policy promises made by predecessors.  In the typical audience cost 
scenario, leaders are accountable for their own promises (e.g., Smith 1998).  This makes sense in 
some cases, but when ties to international organizations are at issue citizens may be positioned to 
defend pledges made by previous administrations.  Under these circumstances, citizens may 
conclude that reneging does not signal incompetence.  Instead, the decision to change policy 
might reflect the recognition that the benefits of membership no longer exceed the costs. 
 Even though Clare’s work clarifies some important issues, the factors that determine the 
public’s valuation of existing foreign policy assets remain unclear in the audience costs literature.  
What, for example, explains voters’ desire to maintain their country’s membership in particular 
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international organizations and when are we to expect voters to decide that resigning the state’s 
membership in an international organization is acceptable?  Below, we discuss our answer to this 
question, drawing on the Investment Model of Individual Commitment.  The Investment Model 
is helpful because it is designed to explain the mechanisms that generate individual commitments 
to particular assets, relationships and/or courses of action.  The factors that engender 
commitments are general ones.  Not surprisingly, tests of the Investment Model suggest it can 
explain varying levels of attachment to a wide range of targets of commitment. 
 In recommending the Investment Model, we recognize that it is not a panacea for 
audience cost theory.  The Investment Model solves a theoretical issue common to audience cost 
approaches, but it creates new problems that must be addressed in the future.  How, for example, 
do leaders who receive public promises judge the credibility of those pledges given variation in 
the willingness of domestic audiences to penalize reneging?  In the usual audience cost set-up, 
foreign leaders assume that any public promise is insured by the promisor’s constituents, but this 
assumption is unsustainable in light of our argument.  Therefore, a puzzle that will remain after 
we discuss the Investment Model is how foreign leaders figure out whether the citizens of other 
states are committed to the foreign policy goods at stake.  This question is beyond the scope of 
our current work, but it is one that must be answered as audience cost models develop.   
 
THE INVESTMENT MODEL OF POLITICAL COMMITMENT 
 
 We conceptualize people’s regard for foreign policy assets, relationships, and/or 
strategies as their commitment to these goods.  Commitments are psychological in nature.  They 
refer to the subjective sense people derive from their involvement in various associations and 
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arrangements (Agnew, Van Lange, Rusbult, and Langston 1998; Rusbult, Martz, and Agnew 
1998).  Commitments are associated with the intention to maintain relationships and/or pursue 
goals over the long term (Arriaga and Agnew 2001; Rusbult and Buunk 1993).   
 Commitments are the product of the outcomes of relationships or courses of action, 
which people evaluate using specific performance criteria.
1
  Initial work on the social 
psychology of commitment suggested that the amount of satisfaction one derives from a 
relationship or course of action is the principle glue that holds social arrangements together.  In 
contrast, the presence of attractive alternatives is the most important disintegrative force.  The 
relative strength of satisfaction and alternatives determine the strength of a person’s commitment 
to the goods in question and help determine whether relationships continue (Adams and Jones 
1997; Arriaga and Agnew 2001; Levinger, 1988; Rusbult and Buunk 1993).   
 Satisfaction is determined using a kind of cost-benefit analysis in which people weigh 
experienced rewards against incurred costs to assess the quality of outcomes.  The product of this 
calculation is compared to personal expectations about what constitutes acceptable results, 
known as the comparison level. Satisfaction is a function of the comparison level and current 
relational outcomes.  Individuals are said to be satisfied with a relationship when outcomes from 
it surpass what they consider acceptable. When relationship outcomes fall short of the 
comparison level, dissatisfaction emerges and commitments decline. 
 Commitments are also influenced by the availability of quality alternatives to a 
relationship and/or course of action.  Alternatives are conceptualized as any arrangement that 
differs from the status quo, including no relationship at all.  When individuals perceive that 
superior options are available, existing relationships can break down.  All things equal, people 
gravitate to those partners capable of providing them with relatively better outcomes.  Absent 
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alternatives, individuals may remain within relationships even if those associations otherwise 
perform poorly.  Thus, alternatives undermine commitments, but only if they are perceived to be 
available and superior to existing arrangements. 
 This basic two factor model of commitment was extended by Caryl Rusbult (1980), who 
proposed that investments are also important for understanding a person’s level of commitment.  
Investments are those concrete (e.g., property) or intangible resources (e.g., time and effort, 
reputation) that would be lost or diminished if a relationship dissolved (Goodfriend and Agnew 
2008; Rusbult, Drigotas, and Verette 1994).  The more one has invested in a relationship or 
course of action, the more one risks losing if it terminates.  Thus, investments bolster 
commitments. 
 The resulting three factor model incorporating satisfaction, alternatives, and investments 
is referred to by social psychologists as the Investment Model (Rusbult 1980).  Although the 
model suggests that satisfaction level, quality of alternatives, and investment size are the 
mechanisms that generate commitment, it takes no position about the relative importance of the 
underlying factors.  In other words, the Investment Model does not suggest that any one of the 
three predictors will be particularly influential in driving commitment.  Instead, satisfaction, 
alternatives, and investments are seen as equal predictors of individual commitment that 
reinforce one another additively. 
 Evidence for the Investment Model’s basic claim that satisfaction, alternatives, and 
investments are mechanisms of individual commitment has been demonstrated repeatedly in a 
wide range of studies focusing on: adult romantic relationships (e.g., Duffy and Rusbult, 1986; 
Kurdek 1991; Kurdek 1995; Rusbult, Johnson, and Morrow 1986); business partnerships (Ping 
1993); and players’ attachments to the game of cricket (Carpenter and Coleman 1998).  Research 
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also suggests that the Investment Model predicts commitments to more diffuse targets including 
residential communities (Lyons and Lowery 1989), organizations, such as community colleges 
(cf. Geyer, Brannon, and Shearon, 1987), and medical regimens (Putnam, Finney, Barkley, and 
Bonner 1994).  In foreign policy, the Investment Model has been used to understand 
commitments to the “War on Terror” (Agnew, Hoffman, Lehmiller and Duncan 2007). 
 By itself, the Investment Model’s ability to understand a wide variety of commitments is 
encouraging for those interested in augmenting audience cost models with a theory of public 
preferences over foreign policy goods.  Satisfaction, alternatives, and investments look to be 
general predictors of commitment to a wide variety of targets.  Still, the wisdom of using the 
Investment Model’s theoretical architecture to solve microfoundational issues in audience cost 
models comes as much from the study of public opinion toward foreign policy as it does from 
social psychological work.  The evidence from survey data suggests that satisfaction operates as 
a commitment-building device among the general public.  Polls of Europeans, for example, 
confirm that satisfaction with the performance of European institutions is an important predictor 
of the public’s interest in furthering European integration (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993).  Recent 
research on “casualty sensitivity” in the U.S. points to similar conclusions: satisfaction with the 
success of military operations is capable of sustaining the public’s support for war even as 
casualties mount (Feaver, Gelpi, and Reifler 2005/06; Eichenberg 2005).   
 Polling data also suggests that alerting people to the availability of alternative course of 
action reduces support for foreign policy actions.  The public’s commitment to the first Gulf War, 
for instance, was noticeably weaker when the possibility of non-military solutions to the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait was discussed with respondents (Mueller 1993).  Finally, the Investment 
Model’s predictions about the integrative effects of investments also appear to borne out in 
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surveys.  For example, Tomz (2007) work on audience costs shows that people are more likely to 
penalize leaders who break their promises and, as a consequence, squander a state’s reputational 
assets – a finding consistent with the notion that investments build commitments. 
 While the available polling evidence is consistent with our expectations, it is unclear 
from the surveys discussed above that any individual Investment Model variable is causally 
related to commitments controlling for the other two.  More generally, it remains to be seen if the 
Investment Model’s causal claims can be demonstrated since the surveys discussed above were 
not designed to test the relationships between satisfaction, alternatives, investments, and 
commitments.  Controlled experiments can help to sort these questions out. 
 In the next section, we outline the hypotheses we derived from the Investment Model.   
Subsequently, we describe the design of laboratory studies we conducted to examine whether the 
Investment Model constructs are capable of illuminating variation in individual commitments to 
political institutions such as the U.N. and NATO.  We conclude with a discussion of the results 
of these tests and their implications for understanding the psychology of individual commitments 




 We focused on the U.S. government’s membership in the U.N. and NATO to examine the 
Investment Model’s capacity to illuminate the mechanisms that drive people’s commitments to 
maintain existing foreign policy relationships.  We focused on the U.N. and NATO for three 
reasons.  First, the U.N. and NATO are bedrocks of the current international system whose utility 
to the U.S. has been questioned (see Layne 2005; Wedgewood 2005).  If audience cost models 
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are right, public attitudes toward these organizations play a role in determining whether leaders 
can withdraw from the U.N. and NATO without suffering significant electoral consequences.  
Second, the U.N. and NATO are relatively well-known organizations around which partisan, 
ideological divides exist (Holsti 2007).  Hence, focusing on the U.N. and NATO enables us to 
compare the predictive capacity of the Investment Model against an important alternative: 
ideology explains individual citizen’s support for U.S. involvement in international organizations 
(Wittkopf 1994).  Finally, U.S. membership in the U.N. and NATO are useful proxies for the 
kinds of foreign policy relationships and assets that audience costs are supposed to protect. 
 Our first hypothesis is that satisfaction with the U.N. and NATO exerts a positive 
influence on the level of individual commitment toward these organizations.  For example, those 
who believe that membership in the U.N. enables the U.S. to manage international conflicts 
effectively are more likely to feel satisfied about the U.N.’s performance and, hence, are more 
likely to be oriented toward maintaining the U.S.’ membership in the world body.  Alternatively, 
those who believe the U.S.’s association with the U.N. adds little to the U.S.’s ability to deal 
with international issues are less likely to be satisfied with the U.N.’s performance and less 
committed to maintaining the U.S.’s status in the organization. 
 Our second hypothesis is that an inverse relationship exists between perceived 
alternatives to the U.N. and NATO and individual commitment to these organizations.  
Alternatives could be other organizations or the appeal of unilateral action.  Compelling 
alternatives to the U.N. and NATO should degrade individuals’ sense of commitment to these 
organizations, while poor alternatives should strengthen the bonds to the U.N. and NATO.   
 Hypothesis three suggests that the perceived size of investment in the U.N. and NATO will 
influence reported commitment levels.  Investments are not only tangible resources, such as 
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financial dues, but also intangible resources, such as time, effort, and reputation.  The more 
people think that these resources have been invested in the U.N. and NATO, the more likely they 
will want to maintain the U.S.’s relationship with these organizations. 
 The fourth hypothesis is that all three predictor constructs (i.e., satisfaction, alternatives, 
and investments), when considered as a set, should predict unique variance in commitment to the 
U.N. and NATO.  Finally, to the extent that the Investment Model’s specified antecedents do 
indeed cause commitment, our fifth hypothesis is that manipulating levels of satisfaction, 
alternatives, and investments should result in corresponding increases or decreases in 
commitment.  Specifically, people will be most committed to NATO and the U.N. when 
satisfaction and investments are described as good and alternatives are described as poor.  
People will be least committed to NATO and the U.N. when satisfaction and investments are 
described as low and alternatives are described as high.  Additionally, conditions containing 
optimal (i.e., commitment-promoting) levels of two or more of the Investment Model constructs 
should yield significantly higher commitment than conditions featuring only one or no optimal 




 We conducted two laboratory-based studies to assess whether commitments to the U.N. 
and NATO are shaped by assessments of satisfaction, alternatives, and investments.  In Study 1, 
subjects were asked to rate statements expressing their personal satisfaction with, sense of 
alternatives to, and concept of investments made in the U.N. and NATO.  Responses to these 
statements were then correlated with their own reported levels of commitment to the U.N. and 
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NATO.  In Study 2, subjects were asked to read fictional statements by Senators from their home 
state about satisfaction with, alternatives to, and investments in the U.N. and NATO.  The 
statements were manipulated in order to provide evidence for a causal connection between the 
Investment Model variables and participants’ levels of commitment to these organizations.  In 
both studies, subjects were denied incentives to provide the “right” answers to our questions (see 
Plott and Zeiler 2005), making it harder for our intuitions to be borne out by our data. 
 Laboratory experiments are appropriate when the research goal is to establish causal 
connections among theoretical variables (McDermott 2002).  In this sense, laboratory 
experiments are akin to formal models in that both are useful for establishing the internal validity 
of theoretical claims.  As we argued above, existing polling work appears to show that 
satisfaction, alternatives, and investments influence public support for a variety of foreign policy 
issues in ways the Investment Model leads us to expect.  Still, the polls were not designed to 
determine the causal relationships between satisfaction, alternatives, investments and 




 In Study 1 we gauged the degree to which our subjects’ own assessments of satisfaction, 
alternatives, and investments predicted their level of commitment to the U.S. government’s 
relationship with the U.N. and NATO.  We adapted items in the Investment Model scale 




Participants [C Head] 
 The sample consisted of 110 undergraduates (77 males, 33 females). Caucasians 
dominated the sample (74%), but Asian Americans (15%), African Americans (5%), and 
“Other[s]” (6%) were also represented. The mean age was 19.63 (SD = 1.16; range = 18 to 23). 
Participants received credit for their involvement in a general psychology course. 
 
Materials and Procedure [C Head] 
 College undergraduates were recruited to participate in a study of “perceptions of various 
international issues.” After obtaining informed consent, we used a computer program to 
administer the measures listed below to participants. 
 
Commitment to NATO. [D Head] Based on the Rusbult et al. (1998) Investment Model Scale, 
we created several four-item measures to tap the model’s constructs as they relate to NATO. For 
satisfaction (α= .81), the items were: “I feel satisfied with the U.S.-NATO relationship,” “The 
relationship between the U.S. and NATO is much better than the U.S.'s other international 
relationships,” “The relationship between the U.S. and NATO is close to ideal,” and “The 
relationship between the U.S. and NATO does a good job of satisfying the U.S.’s international 
security needs.”  
 For alternatives (α= .52), the following items were used: “The alliances other than NATO 
that the U.S. might join are not very appealing,” “The U.S.’s alternatives to NATO are close to 
ideal,” “The U.S.'s alternatives to NATO are attractive,” and “The U.S.'s international security 
needs easily could be fulfilled by an alternative alliance.” 
 For investments (α= .77), the items were: “The U.S. has put a great deal into its 
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relationship with NATO that it would lose if the relationship were to end,” “Many aspects of U.S. 
policy have become linked to NATO and the U.S. would lose all of this if the alliance ended,” 
“The U.S.'s relationships with other countries would be complicated if the U.S. were to end its 
association with NATO,” and “Compared to other members, the U.S. has invested a great deal in 
the NATO alliance.”  
 Finally we assessed each subject’s commitment to NATO (α= .63) with these items: “I 
want the U.S.-NATO relationship to last a very long time,” “I am committed to the U.S. 
maintaining its relationship with NATO,” “I would not feel very upset if the U.S.-NATO 
relationship were to end in the near future,” and “It is likely that I would support the U.S. 
forming a competing alliance (i.e., not with NATO) within the next year.” All of the items were 
rated on a nine-point scale ranging from 0 (do not agree at all) to 8 (agree completely). 
 
Commitment to the U.N. [D Head]  We also created several parallel items to tap the model’s 
constructs as they relate to the U.N. For satisfaction (α= .83), the items were: “I feel satisfied 
with the U.S.-United Nations relationship,” “The relationship between the U.S. and the United 
Nations is much better than the U.S.'s other international relationships,” “The relationship 
between the U.S. and the United Nations is close to ideal,” and “The relationship between the 
U.S. and the United Nations does a good job of satisfying the U.S.’s international security 
needs.”  
 The following items (α= .57) were used to measure alternatives: “The organizations other 
than the United Nations with whom the U.S. might become involved are not very appealing,” 
“The U.S.'s alternatives to the United Nations are close to ideal,” “The U.S.’s alternatives to the 
United Nations are attractive,” and “The U.S.’s international security needs easily could be 
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fulfilled by another international organization.”  
 For investments (α= .74), the items were: “The U.S. has put a great deal into its 
relationship with the United Nations that it would lose if the relationship were to end,” “Many 
aspects of U.S. policy have become linked to the United Nations and the U.S. would lose all of 
this if it were to withdraw from the organization,” “The U.S.’s relationships with other countries 
would be complicated if the U.S. were to end its association with the United Nations,” and 
“Compared to other members, the U.S. has invested a great deal in the United Nations.”  
 Last, for commitment to the U.N (α= .75), the items were: “I want the U.S.-United 
Nations relationship to last a very long time,” “I am committed to the U.S. maintaining its 
relationship with the United Nations,” “I would not feel very upset if U.S. involvement in the 
United Nations were to end in the near future,” and “It is likely that I would support the U.S. 
joining a competing organization (i.e., not the UN) within the next year.” All of the items were 
rated on a nine-point scale ranging from 0 (do not agree at all) to 8 (agree completely). 
 
Political Orientation. [D Head]  Many polls of Americans show partisan differences on questions 
about U.S. foreign policy with conservatives tending to support unilateral policies and liberals 
favoring multilateralism. We controlled for the political orientation of respondents to account for 
the possibility that their answers were influenced by their own political preferences using the 
following item: “I cannot ever see myself voting to elect conservative candidates.” This item was 
drawn from previous research assessing college students’ political orientations (Mehrabian 1996). 
This item was rated on a nine-point scale ranging from 0 (do not agree at all) to 8 (agree 
completely) and reverse-scored so that higher scores indicate conservatism, while lower scores 
indicate liberalism. 
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Political Knowledge. [D Head]  We also created a measure to assess participants’ overall 
knowledge of NATO and the U.N.  As Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) point out, average 
citizens do not have a wealth of political knowledge and younger citizens tend to be among the 
least informed.  To account for the possibility that our questions produced the observed results 
because subjects were ill-informed about the U.N. and NATO, we developed a ten-item political 
knowledge test focused on the international organizations in question.  The measure consisted of 
ten multiple choice items (five regarding NATO, five regarding the U.N.). The NATO items 
included the following: “What does the acronym NATO stand for?” “Which of the following 
terms best describes NATO?” “True or False: NATO's membership recently expanded to include 
former allies of the Soviet Union, such as Estonia.” “NATO has twenty-six member countries. 
Which of the following is NOT a member of NATO?” “NATO was formed in approximately 
what year?  1950, 1960, 1970, or 1980?”  
 The U.N. items included the following: “What is the name of the current Secretary 
General of the United Nations?” “How many countries are permanent members of the United 
Nation's Security Council?” “True or False:  In comparison to other member nations, Japan owes 
the largest amount of back dues to the United Nations.” “The United Nations is made up of six 
major sub-organizations.  Which of the following is NOT one of them?” “True or False: 
Decisions by the U.N. General Assembly are binding on the U.N. members.” Responses to each 
item were coded as “0” (incorrect) or “1” (correct). A total international knowledge score was 
obtained by summing the number of correct responses. Overall scores on this measure were 
continuous, potentially ranging from 0 (no correct responses) to 10 (all correct responses). 
 
Demographic Measures. [D Head] Finally, participants completed several demographic 
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questions, which included questions about age, gender, and race/ethnicity.  Participants were also 
asked to indicate whether they voted in the 2004 Presidential election.  Responses to this 
question were coded as either “yes” (1) or “no” (2). 
 
Results [C Head] 
 Recapping our earlier discussion, the five hypotheses examined in this research are as 
follows: 1) satisfaction with the U.N. and NATO exerts a positive influence on the level of 
individual commitment toward these organizations; 2) an inverse relationship exists between 
perceived alternatives to the U.N. and NATO and individual commitment to these organizations; 
3) the perceived size of investment in the U.N. and NATO will influence reported commitment 
levels; 4) all three predictor constructs (i.e., satisfaction, alternatives, and investments), when 
considered as a set, should predict unique variance in commitment to the U.N. and NATO; 5) 
people will be most committed to NATO and the U.N. when satisfaction and investments are 
described as good and alternatives are described as poor.  People will be least committed to 
NATO and the U.N. when satisfaction and investments are described as low and alternatives are 
described as high.  Additionally, conditions containing optimal (i.e., commitment-promoting) 
levels of two or more of the Investment Model constructs should yield significantly higher 
commitment than conditions featuring only one or no optimal level of a predictor.  By and large, 
all of these hypotheses were supported for both the U.N. and NATO. 
 Table II presents partial correlations of satisfaction, alternatives, investments and 
commitment by international target. We computed partial correlations to control for possible 
effects due to gender, political orientation (conservatism/liberalism), political involvement 
(voting behavior in 2004 election), and international knowledge.  This allowed us to rule out the 
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possibility that these factors could explain the observed associations.  Results revealed that both 
satisfaction (r=.55, p<.01) and investments (r=.35, p<.01) were significantly correlated and 
alternatives (r=-.17, p<.10) were marginally correlated with commitment to NATO. Similarly, 
satisfaction (r=.49, p<.01), investments (r=.54, p<.01), and alternatives (r=-.25, p<.01) were all 
significantly correlated with commitment to the U.N. This pattern of results provides strong 
support for our predictions. 
 Hypothesis 4 specifies that satisfaction, alternatives, and investments each explain unique 
variance in observed levels of commitment to NATO and the U.N. This hypothesis was largely 
supported for both international targets, as can be seen below in Tables III and IV.  In a model 
that includes only the Investment Model variables to predict commitment to NATO (see Table 
III, Model 3), both satisfaction (β=.53, p<.01) and alternatives (β=-.22, p<.01), were significant 
predictors, accounting for nearly two-fifths of the explained variance.  Investments, however, 
was not a statistically significant predictor when assessed alongside satisfaction and alternatives. 
 These associations remained largely unchanged when controlling for gender, political 
orientation, political involvement, and international knowledge (see Table IV, Model 2). 
Additionally, including these control variables did not improve the amount of variance explained 
beyond that produced by the Investment Model variables alone (p=.50).  In a model that included 
only the Investment Model variables relating to the U.N., (see Table IV, Model 3 below) 
satisfaction (β=.40, p<.01), alternatives (β=-.28, p<.01), and investments (β=.36, p<.01) were all 
significant predictors of commitment, accounting for nearly half of the explained variance 
(R
2
=.48). These associations are significant even when controls for gender, political orientation, 
political involvement, and international knowledge are introduced.  Similar to the NATO 
analysis, controlling for these variables did not lead to a significant increase in explained 
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 Study 1 was useful for establishing that reported levels of commitment covary with 
subjects’ self-reports about their own satisfaction with, sense of investment in, and beliefs about 
alternatives to the UN and NATO.  Study 2 is designed to examine if there is a causal 
relationship between the Investment Model constructs and reported levels of commitment to the 
UN and NATO.  We examined this question by manipulating experimentally participants’ 
perceived levels of satisfaction, alternatives, and investments toward the U.N. and NATO. We 
expected that participants would be most committed to these international organizations when 
satisfaction and investments are high, while alternatives are low.  The least committed 
participants would be those who are exposed to statement expressing low satisfaction and low 
investments and describing high quality alternatives to these institutions (Hypotheses 5 and 5b). 
 
Participants [C Head] 
The sample consisted of 194 undergraduates (143 males, 51 females). Participants were 
predominantly Caucasian (88%); some indicated that they were Asian American (6%), African 
American (4%), Hispanic American (2%), or “Other” (1%). The mean age was 19.59 (SD = 1.15; 
range = 18 to 24).  All participants received credit for a general psychology course. 
 
Experimental Design and Materials [C Head] 
NATO Manipulation. [D Head] For the manipulation of the Investment Model variables as they 
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relate to NATO, we crossed the three bases of commitment (satisfaction, alternatives, and 
investments) with two levels of strength (high, low), yielding eight experimental conditions. 
Each condition consisted of one statement indicating high or low satisfaction (“The United States 
is extremely pleased with its relationship with the NATO alliance because it vastly outperforms 
what the United States expects from international alliances” vs. “The United States is extremely 
displeased with its relationship with the NATO alliance because it vastly underperforms what the 
United States expects from international alliances”), one statement indicating high or low 
investments (“The United States is staking its valuable reputation on its relationship with the 
NATO alliance by providing it with enormous resources, personnel and logistic support” vs. 
“The United States is not staking its valuable reputation on its relationship with the NATO 
alliance by providing it with enormous resources, personnel and logistic support”), and one 
statement indicating high or low alternatives (“The United States has many international partners 
who could replace the NATO alliance because NATO lacks unique strategic value to the United 
States” vs. “The United States has no international partners who could replace the NATO 
alliance because of NATO's unique strategic value to the United States”). Thus, each condition 
consisted of a total of three statements, with each of the Investment Model variables represented 
once. Participants were assigned to one of the eight conditions randomly.  A random procedure 
was also used to determine the order in which the statements were presented to participants. 
 
U.N. Manipulation. [D Head] For the manipulation of the Investment Model variables as they 
relate to the U.N., we followed the same procedure described above for NATO.  Each condition 
consisted of one statement indicating high or low satisfaction (“The United States is extremely 
pleased with its relationship with the United Nations because the U.N. vastly outperforms what 
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the United States expects from international organizations” vs. “The United States is extremely 
displeased with its relationship with the United Nations because the U.N. vastly underperforms 
what the United States expects from international organizations”), one statement indicating high 
or low investments (“The United States is staking its valuable reputation on its relationship with 
the United Nations by providing it with enormous resources, personnel and logistic support” vs. 
“The United States is not staking its valuable reputation on its relationship with the United 
Nations by providing it with enormous resources, personnel and logistic support”), and one 
statement indicating high or low alternatives (“The United States can replace its relationship with 
the United Nations by associating itself with other international organizations because contact 
with United Nations' members is not critical for the United States” vs. “The United States cannot 
replace its relationship with the United Nations by associating itself with other international 
organizations because contact with United Nations' members is critical for the United States”). In 
other word, each condition consisted of a total of three statements, with each of the Investment 
Model variables represented once. Participants were assigned to one of the eight conditions 
randomly.  Note that target of commitment was a within-subject factor: each participant provided 
responses with respect to both NATO and the U.N; we determined randomly whether questions 
about the U.N. or NATO were asked first. 
 
Manipulation Check. [D Head] Participants were presented with three items to assess the degree 
to which our manipulations influenced the bases of commitment to NATO, and three parallel 
items to assess the success of our manipulations of the bases of commitment to the U.N. Of the 
items, one assessed satisfaction, one assessed investments, and one assessed alternatives. For 
satisfaction, the item was, “Based upon the previous statements, the United States is satisfied 
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with its relationships with NATO/the United Nations.” For investments, the item was, “Based 
upon the previous statements, the United States has put a great deal into its relationship with 
NATO/the United Nations that it would lose if the relationship were to end.” For alternatives, the 
item was, “Based upon the previous statements, the United States' alternatives to its relationship 
with NATO/the United Nations are close to ideal (e.g., finding another international alliance/ 
associating itself with other international organizations).” For each participant, these items were 
presented in a random order. Responses were rated on a nine-point scale ranging from 0 (do not 
agree at all) to 8 (agree completely). Results of the manipulation checks are presented below. 
 
Commitment to NATO and the U.N. [D Head] Commitment to NATO was measured using the 
following four items (α=.94): “I want our relationship with NATO to last a very long time,” “I 
feel very attached to our relationship -- very strongly linked to NATO,” “I am oriented toward 
the long-term future of our relationship with NATO,” and “I am committed to maintaining our 
relationship with NATO.” Commitment to the U.N. was also assessed with four items (α =.95): 
“I want our relationship with the United Nations to last a very long time,” “I feel very attached to 
our relationship -- very strongly linked to the United Nations,” “I am oriented toward the long-
term future of our relationship with the United Nations,” and “I am committed to maintaining our 
relationship with the United Nations.”  All of the commitment items were rated on a nine-point 
scale ranging from 0 (do not agree at all) to 8 (agree completely). 
 
Other Measures. [D Head] The same conservatism/liberalism item was again administered to 
assess individuals’ political orientations. Participants also completed the international knowledge 
and demographic measures used in Study 1.  
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Procedure [C Head] 
College undergraduates were recruited for participation in a study of “perceptions of 
various international issues.” After obtaining informed consent, we presented participants with 
instructions using a computer program. Participants were first instructed to do the following: 
“Imagine that a United States Senator from your state is interested in your opinion regarding a 
number of international issues facing the U.S.. Your Senator has provided you with three pieces 
of information concerning each issue.  Please read the information and, based upon it, answer the 
questions that follow.” Next, we randomly assigned participants to one of the eight possible 
NATO or eight possible U.N. conditions.  Immediately afterwards, participants completed the 
manipulation check questions and indicated their current level of commitment to NATO or the 
UN, as appropriate. Afterwards, participants received the following instructions: “Now, imagine 
that your Senator would like you to consider a different international issue.  On the following 
screens, you will again be presented with three separate pieces of information, followed by a few 
questions.” Participants were then randomly assigned to a second experimental condition 
concerning the other international target. That is, if participants read about NATO first, they read 
about the U.N. second, and vice versa. Finally, the remaining dependent measures were 
presented. After completing all questionnaires, participants were debriefed. 
 
Manipulation Checks [C Head] 
 Participants in the four high satisfaction conditions reported significantly higher 
satisfaction than those participants in the four low satisfaction conditions for both NATO, 
F(7,186)=156.17, p < .001, and the U.N., F(7,186)=206.70, p < .001. Similarly, participants in 
the four high alternatives conditions reported significantly higher alternatives than those 
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participants in the four low alternatives conditions for both NATO, F(7,186)=40.16, p < .001, 
and the U.N., F(7,186)=31.01, p < .001. Finally, participants in the four high investment 
conditions reported significantly higher investment than those participants in the four low 
investment conditions for both NATO, F(7,186)=24.93, p < .001, and the U.N., F(7,186)=8.20, p 
< .01.  This suggests that the Investment Model constructs were manipulated successfully. 
 
Results [C Head] 
 To begin, we used analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test the prediction that participants 
were most committed to NATO and to the U.N. when satisfaction and investments were 
described as high while alternatives were described as low relative to when satisfaction and 
investments were described as low and alternatives were described as high.  Consistent with 
Hypothesis 5, significantly higher commitment was reported in the high satisfaction / high 
investment / low alternatives condition versus the low satisfaction / low investment / high 
alternatives condition for both NATO, F(7,186)=13.09, p < .001, and the U.N., F(7,186)=4.30, p 
< .05. Means for all conditions appear in Table V. 
 Next, we tested whether participants were most committed to NATO and the U.N. when 
two or more of the Investment Model variables were optimal for commitment promotion (e.g., 
high satisfaction, low alternatives) relative to models containing only one of the constructs.  As 
expected, participants reported higher commitment when at least two of the Investment Model 
variables were optimal for commitment promotion versus when one or less of the variables were 
optimal for both NATO, F(7,186)=3.47, p = .064, and the U.N., F(7,186)=5.76, p < .05.   
Finally, analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was used to control for the effects of gender, 
participation in the 2004 presidential election, knowledge about international alliances, and 
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political conservatism. This allowed us to rule out the possibility that these other variables were 
responsible for the observed effects. Even in a model containing these control variables, both 
analyses yielded the same results. That is, significantly higher commitment was still reported in 
the high satisfaction / high investment / low alternatives condition versus the low satisfaction / 
low investment / high alternatives condition for both NATO, F(7,186)=11.62, p < .001, and the 
U.N., F(7,186)=3.94, p < .05.  Additionally, participants still tended to report higher 
commitment when at least two of the Investment Model variables were optimal versus when one 
or less of the variables were optimal for both NATO, F(7,186)=3.23, p = .074, and the U.N., 




 Taken together, studies 1 and 2 suggest that satisfaction, alternatives, and investments are 
central to the production of individual commitments to the UN and NATO.  Study 1 showed that 
people’s own sense of satisfaction with the performance of the U.N. or NATO, judgment about 
the level of investments in the U.N. and NATO, and sense of the quality of alternatives to these 
organizations were all significantly associated with reported levels of commitment. These results 
persist even when controls for gender, conservatism, political knowledge, and participation in the 
2004 election were introduced. 
Based on our subjects’ responses in the first study, we were also able to explore the 
explanatory power of the Investment Model constructs. For both the U.N. and NATO, the 
Investment Model constructs explained 48% and 38% of the variance in commitment to each of 
the respective targets. These results are between 6.5 and 8 times larger than models that only 
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control for gender, conservatism, political knowledge, and participation in the 2004 election. 
Including measures of the Investment Model constructs appears to provide substantial 
explanatory benefits. The one caveat is that in models predicting commitment to NATO, 
investments did not produce statistically significant results when considered along with the other 
Investment Model predictors. It appears that this unexpected result was caused by collinearity 
with the measure of satisfaction (see Table II). 
In Study 2, we tested whether experimental manipulations of the Investment 
Model variables produced expected changes in levels of commitment to the U.N. and NATO. 
The results suggest causal connections between the Investment Model variables and commitment 
to international organizations and alliances. People in the high satisfaction/high investments/low 
alternatives condition reported significantly higher levels of commitment than subjects in the low 
satisfaction/low investments/high alternatives condition. That is, those who the Investment 
Model predicts should have the strongest commitments consistently expressed greater attachment 
to the U.N. and NATO than subjects we anticipated would have the weakest commitments to 
these organizations. This result obtains even when controls are introduced.  
 Study 2 also suggests that psychological commitments to international organizations are 
driven by multiple factors: models that used only one of the Investment Model constructs 
underperformed those that included two or more.  The “salience” (Clare 2007) of foreign policy 
assets operates along multiple dimensions.  It is worth noting that the results from Study 2 are 
robust even when the analysis is restricted to the most politically knowledgeable participants (i.e. 
those scoring 5 or higher on our political knowledge scale). That is, significantly higher 
commitment was reported in the high satisfaction/ high investment / low alternatives condition 
versus the low satisfaction / low investment / high alternatives for both the U.N. (contrast p<.10) 
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and NATO (contrast p<.001).  Political knowledge is a predictor of political participation (Delli 
Carpini and Keeter 1996).  By implication, our results suggest that the Investment Model 
variables predict commitment levels among those who are most likely to use their votes to 
penalize leaders who violate longstanding agreements.  This is the voting demographic leaders 
must worry about when they contemplate the costs and benefits of reneging on past promises.  
 Some may worry about the generalizability of findings based on a convenience sample of 
college students.  However, it would be a mistake to dismiss the findings as peculiar to the 
subject pool we used.  First, available evidence does not clearly support the notion that 
undergraduates are poor proxies for older Americans when it comes to understanding the 
dynamics of public opinion.  Holsti (2007), for example, concludes that generational differences 
are at best inconsistent in accounting for the dynamics of opinion in the United States.  Existing 
polls using national probability samples provide further support for the Investment Model 
constructs.  Second, studies of the Investment Model have successfully predicted commitment 
levels not just in college sophomores, but also in adults.  The research described above surely 
needs additional confirmation as to its generalizability, but satisfaction, alternatives, and 
investments appear to be robust predictors of commitments regardless of either who is asked or 




 Audience cost models are important theoretically because they establish a link between 
the public in democratic societies and the credibility of foreign policy promises.  Therefore, these 
models hold the promise of explaining observed differences between democratic and 
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nondemocratic states in world affairs.  Leaders who abrogate public promises are subject to 
penalties administered by voters who police ineptitude by elected officials by voting them out of 
office.  The prospect of these penalties restrains leaders from backing away from their pledges, 
solidifying the credibility of promises made to others and giving democracies an edge in 
interstate bargaining (Fearon 1994).   
 Yet, like many important arguments about international relations, the microfoundations 
of audience cost arguments require more theoretical work.  Audience cost models rest on the 
assumption that voters always penalize leaders who renege, but the empirical record suggests 
that voters administer penalties selectively.  Consequently, audience cost models offer little 
explanatory leverage with respect to the varying preferences voters have for promise-keeping 
and tend to overestimate the actual credibility of public promises issued by leaders.  The 
inflexibility of underlying audience cost assumptions constitutes an important limitation on the 
capacity of these models to successfully predict international interactions. 
We think the Investment Model provides a partial solution to this microfoundational 
problem by offering an answer to questions about the conditions under which citizens are likely 
to value the foreign policy goods and relationships at stake when leaders consider reneging.  
Specifically, this research suggests that leaders face the prospect of audience imposed penalties if 
they abandon relationships that the public believes perform satisfactorily, have received 
significant investments, and have few competitors.  In contrast, when the people think that 
relational outcomes are poor, that little has been invested in relationships, and that more 
appealing associations are available, leaders are unlikely to suffer if they change course. 
 Thinking beyond theory and about public policy more generally, our research suggests 
that leaders who decide certain national commitments are no longer desirable can influence faith 
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in those ties.  Audience cost models suggest leaders are stuck with the commitments they inherit 
or make because the public’s preference for maintaining those assets are seen as fixed.  However, 
leaders can either strengthen or weaken public support for foreign policy positions, which they 
clearly try to do by framing issues for the public.  The key is crafting messages that highlight the 
costs or benefits of particular courses of action, the level of investment in particular positions, 
and the availability of alternatives to the status quo.  Leaders who highlight just one of these 
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Investment Model Hypotheses 
  
Hypothesis one: Satisfaction with the U.N. and NATO exerts a positive 
influence on the level of individual commitment toward 
these organizations. 
  
Hypothesis two: An inverse relationship exists between perceived 
alternatives to the U.N. and NATO and individual 
commitment to these organizations. 
  
Hypothesis three: The perceived size of investment in the U.N. and NATO 
will influence reported commitment levels. 
  
Hypothesis four: Considered as a set, all three variables (i.e., satisfaction, 
alternatives, and investments),  will predict unique variance 
in commitment to the U.N. and NATO. 
  
Hypothesis five: People will be most committed to NATO and the U.N. when 
satisfaction and investments are described as good and 
alternatives are described as poor.  People will be least 
committed to NATO and the U.N. when satisfaction and 
investments are described as low and alternatives are 
described as high.   
  
Hypothesis five (b): Conditions containing optimal (i.e., commitment-
promoting) levels of two or more of the Investment Model 
constructs should yield significantly higher commitment 


















         .55*       -.17         .35* 
Satisfaction 
 
        .49*         .12         .51* 
Alternatives 
 
       -.25*         .12          .03 
Investments 
 
        .54*         .41       -.06  
 
Note. Values above the diagonal represent correlations for NATO, while values below the 
diagonal represent correlations for the U.N. All values are controlling for political conservatism, 
knowledge of international alliances, participation in the 2004 presidential election, and gender. 









Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Conservatism    .12   .02  
Knowledge   -.18   .05  
Voted in 2004 Election   .02  -.14  
Gender   .13   .07  
Satisfaction Level    .54**   .53** 
Quality of Alternatives   -.23**  -.22** 
Investment Size    .08   .11 
    
R
2 
  .05   .40   .38 
 
Note. All values except R
2
 represent standardized beta weights. N = 110. 
**p < .01.  
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Table IV. 





Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Conservatism    -.02   .05  
Knowledge    -.23*  -.05  
Voted in 2004 Election   -.02   .09  
Gender   -.08  -.04  
Satisfaction Level    .39**   .40** 
Quality of Alternatives   -.27**  -.28** 
Investment Size    .38**   .36** 
    
R
2 
  .07   .50   .48 
 
Note. All values except R
2
 represent standardized beta weights. N = 110. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
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Table V.  
Study 2: Mean Levels of Commitment by Experimental Condition and International Target 
 
Experimental Condition    NATO   U.N. 
Satisfaction Alternatives Investments   
High  Low  High   6.14 (0.34)  6.97 (0.41)   
High  High  High   5.94 (0.37)  6.03 (0.43) 
High  Low  Low   5.59 (0.37)  6.57 (0.43)  
High  High  Low   5.99 (0.37)  5.49 (0.43) 
Low  Low  High   6.00 (0.36)  5.10 (0.43) 
Low  High  High   5.86 (0.30)  5.59 (0.42) 
Low  Low  Low   5.64 (0.36)  4.96 (0.39) 
Low  High  Low   4.32 (0.37)  5.86 (0.35)   
 
Note. Numbers represent mean levels of commitment, while values in parentheses represent 
standard errors. N = 194. 
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NOTES 
1. This perspective draws on insights from Interdependence Theory (see Kelly and Thibaut, 
1978; Rusbult, Arriaga, and Agnew, 2001; Thibaut and Kelly, 1959). 
  
 
